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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
While social psychologists and others have exerted 
considerable effort in understanding the dynamics of 
cooperative, competitive, and mixed-motive games (e.g., the 
PDG: prisoner's dilemma game) as models of social 
interaction, relatively little attention has been given to 
the nonverbal behaviors of these situations. Research that 
has been conducted has concentrated on such nonverbal 
behaviors as duration of eye contact (Exline, 1963), the 
proxemic effects on subsequent behavior (Gardin, Kaplan, 
Firestone, & Cowan, 1973), or the effects of the presence or 
isolation of the other interactant (Wichman, 1970). 
Conflict studies in which subjects speak into a strange 
apparatus, pass "canned notes", or write notes and talk to 
each other before making a decision, have all been treated 
together under the common label "communication", while the 
many important nonverbal forms of communication have been 
largely ignored (Wichman, 1970). Rubin and Brown (1975) 
reflect the prevalent view in the literature that nonverbal 
communication has an important role in bargaining and 
negotiation, but their summary of relevant research, points 
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basically to a lack of information on the subject of how 
nonverbal communication affects bargaining and negotiation. 
Nonverbal expressiveness is not entirely a new field. 
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Darwin (1872) wrote about the expressiveness of emotion in 
man and animals long before the term nonverbal behavior was 
popularized. Recent interest in nonverbal expressiveness 
seems to include a belief that some nonverbal behaviors may 
not be totally under voluntary control and may thus serve as 
a vector to true inner feelings and beliefs. 
Hayes, Meltzer, and Bouma (1968) have suggested that 
some interpersonal dimensions may be controlled by a partic-
ular communication mode. An extension of this idea would 
suggest that people may communicate some messages essential 
to interpersonal rapport only (or at least primarily) by 
nonverbal means. The transmission of emotional meaning, for 
example, which plays a large part in social control is often 
carried out nonverbally by such expressions as frowns and 
smiles. Current studies show that much information about a 
person's affective state, the cooperative and competitive 
nature of social interactions, and interpersonal intimacy 
can be communicated accurately in nonverbal expressive 
behaviors (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Hall, 1966). 
Goffman (1959) has compared social interaction to a 
theatrical performance with verbal and nonverbal "lines" 
which we manage to keep appropriate to the current situ-
a ti on. Individuals do try to influence and control the 
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images that others form of them during social interaction. 
Impression management through the use of "lines" seems to be 
a fact of social life, and this is particularly true in bar-
gaining and conflict situations. However, studies have 
shown distinct and important differences in the extent to 
which people can and do control and manage their self-pres-
entation, expressive behaviors, and nonverbal displays of 
affect (Snyder, 1979). 
Interpersonal Orientation 
Rubin and Brown (1975) in a review of individual 
differences in bargaining behavior, suggest that the 
bargaining world can be divided into two basic types of 
people on a dimension they call Interpersonal Orientation or 
IO. Along this dimension, bargainers view and react very 
differently. A bargainer who is high on the Interpersonal 
Orientation continuum (high IO) is thought to be responsive 
to the interpersonal aspects of a relationship with others. 
There is concern and reaction to variation in the other 
person's behavior. The high IO person seeks information 
about the other person and usually will attribute changes in 
behavior to the person's personality rather than to 
situational attributions. The observant bargainer is also 
likely to draw upon nonverbal cues from the actor (other 
person) and to be particularly sensitive to the actor's 
manner (Thomas & Pondy, 1977). 
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The other end of the interpersonal orientation 
continuum is the low IO person. This person is 
nonresponsive to interpersonal aspects of a relationship 
with the other person. The low IO person is neither 
interested in cooperating or competing with the other but 
only in maximizing personal gain. The low IO individual 
basically treats the other as a nonperson, a machine who is 
expected to reason and behave much like the low IO person. 
Changes in the other's behavior is attributed to situational 
factors, rather than to the other person's personality. 
On a separate dimension, an individual may be 
competitively or cooperatively predisposed. The high IO 
person who is cooperatively inclined enters the bargaining 
relationship with a posture of trust, expecting his/her 
cooperative gestures to be reciprocated. The high IO person 
who is competitively inclined enters the bargaining arena 
with an eye on taking advantage of the other person. There 
is suspicion, a view of the other person as untrustworthy. 
The high IO competitively oriented person expects the other 
person to also be competitive, and a cooperative other is 
viewed as being a sucker or a fool. 
In a review of individual difference variables, Rubin 
and Brown (1975) characterized a number of these variables 
in relation to Interpersonal Orientation. In the study of 
individual differences in conflict and bargaining, nonverbal 
expressiveness has not been examined in relation to 
interpersonal orientation. The study of individual 
differences in nonverbal expressiveness has generally 
employed a group of observers to serve as judges. If the 
judges are able to recognize the emotion, the subject was 
said to be a good sender. This method is extremely costly 
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in terms of equipment and subject time. Sender ability can 
also vary as a function of the judges used. Recently, there 
have been several attempts to develop paper-and-pencil 
self-report measures of nonverbal expressiveness (e.g., the 
Self-Monitoring Scale by Snyder, 1974). Such methods could 
and have been used in a number of studies involving 
nonverbal communication. 
Friedman, Prince, Riggio, and DiMatteo (1980) have 
developed a self-report measure called the Affective 
Communication Test (ACT) which purports to measure nonverbal 
expressiveness. Nonverbal expressiveness, as measured by 
the ACT, might be viewed as an aspect of the Interpersonal 
Orientation dimension. More specifically, the highly 
expressive person should be more like the high IO person 
than the low IO person. However, expressiveness by itself 
can not determine whether the person will be cooperatively 
or competitively oriented. Machiavellianism has been found 
to be negatively related to cooperativeness. 
Machiavellianism is an interpersonal orientation 
associated with skills in the kind of social influence known 
as "conning'' or manipulating others in certain situations. 
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The Machiavellianism Scale, developed by Christie and Geis 
(1970a), is a measure of this orientation. Machiavellianism 
will be used to represent a personality characteristic along 
the common cooperative-competitive dimensional continuum. A 
person's level of nonverbal expressiveness will be used to 
represent an aspect of the interpersonal orientation 
continuum. Thus, by relating cooperative behavior in the 
PDG to the relationship between nonverbal expressiveness and 
Machiavellianism, a two-dimensional view of individual 
differences in "bargaining" behavior can be tested. While 
there are other two-dimensional models for describing 
conflict behaviors (e.g., Thomas, 1976; Hall, 1969), none of 
these models include any nonverbal considerations. The 
major purpose of this study is to test this dimensional 
concept with nonverbal expressiveness representing one of 
the possible dimensions. Further research on the ACT and 
and Machiavellianism is described in more detail later. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Rubin and Brown (1975, p. 2) define bargaining as "the 
process whereby two or more parties attempt to settle what 
each shall give and take, or perform and receive, in a 
transaction between them." Rubin and Brown (1975) further 
delineate structural and social psychological characteris-
tics of bargaining relationships. These include: 
a. At least two parties are involved. 
b. The parties have a conflict of interest with 
respect to one or more different issues. 
c. Regardless of the existence of prior experi-
ences or acquaintance with one another, the 
parties are at least temporarily joined 
together in a special kind of voluntary rela-
tionship. 
d. Activity in the relationship concerns:(a) the 
division or exchange of one of more specific 
resources and/or (b) the resolution of one of 
more intangible issues among the parties or 
among those whom they represent. 
e. The activity usually involves the presentation 
of demands or proposals by one party, evalua-
tion of these by the other, followed by con-
cessions and counterproposals. The activity 
is thus sequential rather than simultaneous 
(p. 18). 
The method chosen to study conflict and bargaining with non-
verbal behaviors should contain these prominent characteris-
tics of the bargaining relationship. 
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The Prisoner's Dilemma Game 
The Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG), attributed to a 
mathematician, A.W. Tucker (Luce & Raiffa, 1957), is a 
two-person situation in which each player must abandon the 
possibility of maximizing hisjher short-term profit to enjoy 
the greatest long-term profit. Thus, the PDG represents a 
mixed-motive situation, in which there are incentives both 
to cooperate and to compete. In the PDG, players make 
repeated choices between alternatives which have been 
labeled "cooperativeness" and "defection" (Rapoport & 
Chamma, 1965). The two responses are assumed to represent 
the motives of cooperation and competition. Because the PDG 
paradigm represents these motives so classically, extensive 
research in the area of conflict and negotiation has 
employed it as a model. Appendix A shows the PDG model to 
be used in this study. 
An analysis of the extent to which the PDG satisfies 
each of the characteristics of a true bargaining 
relationship (Rubin & Brown, 1975), shows that all of the 
characteristics except for (c) (which is partially 
satisfied) are satisfied. In a true bargaining situation, 
each party must be able to choose when to enter, and how 
long to remain in the relationship. While this is not true 
for the PDG, it should not adversively affect the results of 
this exploratory study. 
The PDG model to be used in this study will allow 
players to send and receive message choices prior to their 
actual choices. This has the added advantage of allowing 
for the study of deceptive communication at the same time 
that conflict is studied. Each message event in this PDG 
model represents a pure case of truth or lying on the part 
of a player. This serves the secondary purpose of this 
study, to investigate the effects of deception on further 
interactions and to study the relationship of deception to 
nonverbal expressiveness. 
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Researchers in the area of conflict and negotiations 
have varied a number of experimental variables using the PDG 
model including: the number of trials, the structure of the 
payoff matrix, the presence of a real other player, and many 
others (Lave, 1965). These experiments have shown that the 
PDG is an extremely delicate situation in which apparently 
subtle changes in conditio~s give rise to wide differences 
in the amount of cooperation found. This review of the 
literature will deal with variables that concern nonverbal 
conditions related to conflict and cooperation using the PDG 
model as well as other models of bargaining. 
Availability of Communication 
In a social interaction, communication is not 
restricted to only verbal information. Extensive research 
has shown that nonverbal communication plays a major role in 
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influencing social interactions (Duncan, 1969). Several 
social psychologists have studied the effects of verbal and 
nonverbal communication in a bargaining situation. Wichman 
(1970) investigated the effects of the extent to which 
subjects may see or hear one another while engaged in a 
bargaining task. Wichman (1970) had pairs of subjects play 
the PDG with either no communication, audio-only, 
vision-only, or audio-vision. Subjects were allowed to 
communicate anything they wished given the various 
constraints of each experimental condition. Results showed 
significantly more cooperation in the audio-vision condition 
(87%), with lower cooperation for audio-only (72%), 
vision-only (48%), and no communication (41%) conditions. 
Wichman concluded that the high degree of competitiveness 
typically found in the PDG studies may largely be mediated 
by the isolation imposed on the players. Similarly, 
LaPlante (1971) investigated the effects of communication 
mediums with the type of message sent, using a PDG model in 
which only one of the pair was a subject, the other being a 
confederate. At certain points in the game, the confederate 
sent a standardized friendly or unfriendly message in 
written form, by audio-only, by audio-video, or 
face-to-face. There was significantly less cooperation by 
subjects in the audio-only unfriendly message condition, as 
compared with the other seven conditions. The subjects' 
rating results also showed a significant medium effect. 
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These results suggest that the ''richer" mediums, such as 
face-to-face, emphasize the affective content of the 
messages more than other mediums, such as the audio-only or 
the written notes. 
In an experiment on conflict and negotiations with an 
alliance, Vitz and Kite (1970) varied physical facilities 
which regulate the kind and degree of nonverbal information 
available between bargainers. Subjects played a 
mixed-motive game called "crisis" either face-to-face, by 
telephone, or by sending typewritten messages. In contrast 
to findings of Wichman (1970) and LaPlante (1971), players 
reported almost no difficulty in negotiating over the 
telephone. The absence of visual information was apparently 
unimportant. Vitz and Kite (1970) concluded that lack of 
difference may have been caused by the informal procedures 
and especially the fact that both subjects met each other 
and interacted during the period when the game was explained 
and their role as players were set up. 
The present study will also investigate the effects of 
seeing one another while interacting in a PDG situation. It 
is expected that players that can see each other will 
exhibit more cooperative behavior. Wiley (1973, p. 537), 
however, states that "nonverbal cues available during a game 
situation of short length are not relevant where subjects 
have seen each other before the game." Therefore, subjects 
in this study will not be allowed to see each other before 
the game begins. 
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Physical Arrangement 
The physical seating arrangement of a bargaining 
situation, while seemingly trival, has been approached with 
great seriousness in many important international 
negotiations. An example is the heated, time-consuming 
debate over the size of the negotiation table and the 
seating arrangements of the participants that preceded the 
Paris peace talks on the Vietnamese war. 
Sommer (1969) asked people to draw preferred seating 
arrangements for various activities using a diagram of 
rectangular tables. A majority preferred side-by-side to 
across-table seating for a hypothetical cooperative task, 
while a large plurality preferred across-table to 
side-by-side seating for a hypothetical competitive task. 
Sommer suggests that the preference for opposite seating 
typically found in competitive relationships probably 
reflects a desire to obtain information about one's 
competitor, rather than a desire to establish a friendly 
interpersonal relationship with the person. 
Gardin, Kaplan, Firestone, and Cowan (1973) 
investigated the effects of seating arrangement and the 
availability of eye contact on cooperation in a PDG 
situation. Their results showed more positive cooperation 
tended to be correlated with side-by-side seating when eye 
contact is blocked. However, when eye contact is available, 
more cooperation was found with the across-table seating 
arrangement. 
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Eye Contact and Gazing 
Research has shown that eye contact may serve a number 
of functions in a social interaction. Argyle and Dean 
(1965) postulated that eye contact serves the following 
functions: (1) information seeking, (2) signaling when the 
channel is open, (3) concealment and exhibitionism, and (4) 
establishment and recognition of social relationship. 
Kleinke and Pohlen (1971) define "gaze" as the process of 
one person focusing his eyes on another, the latter not 
reciprocating. When two people are involved in simultaneous 
gaze, the condition is called "eye contact", or mutual gaze. 
Ellsworth and Carlsmith (1968) found an interaction 
between eye contact and the favorableness of the message. 
Subjects were interviewed by an interviewer instructed to 
give positive or negative messages while making eye contact 
or not looking (gazing at the subject's ear). When the 
verbal content was positive, the gazing interviewer was 
rated more favorably. In contrast, gazing increased 
subjects' negative evaluations of the interviewer when 
verbal content was negative. Exline (1963) induced a 
cooperative or competitive orientation into three person 
discussion groups, and found that the duration of eye 
contact decreased in the competitive condition for high 
affiliators but increased for low affiliators. These two 
studies suggest that while eye contact may affect 
interpersonal relations, what the person is saying and their 
social needs are also important. 
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Kleinke and Pohlen (1971) investigated the relationship 
between gazing and attitudes of liking and attraction. They 
had subjects play the PDG against a confederate opponent who 
emitted a constant gaze or no gaze and played with a stategy 
of either 100% cooperation, 90% cooperation or 100% 
competition. They found that the confederates' cooperation 
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but not their gaze affected ratings of liking. However, 
these results do not generalize to many situations because 
the confederate gazed constantly or not at all. There are 
very few examples of this type of interaction in the real 
world. In a better study, Foddy (1978) videotaped naive 
subjects playing a bargaining game called the "minimum 
necessary share game". She found that the average length of 
gaze and mutual gazing (eye contact) was greater for 
cooperators, while the frequency of gaze and eye contact 
were the same for both cooperation and competition. Foddy 
suggests that visual behavior may provide a major means of 
signaling a particular intention. A cooperative gaze 
pattern may be used to make advances to the other player 
without initial committment. Refusal to engage in eye 
contact may indicate a desire to enter into competition. 
Self-Monitoring Scale 
Snyder (1974) proposed a social psychological construct 
of self-monitoring of expressive behavior. Snyder advanced 
the idea that people differ in the extent to which they 
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monitor their behavior according to situational cues of 
social appropriateness. To measure these differences, the 
Self-Monitoring Scale was developed (Snyder, 1974). The 
self-monitoring scale is a set of 25 true-false, self-report 
statements designed to discriminate between high and low 
self-monitors. The prototypic high self-monitor is one who: 
(1) is concerned with the social appropriateness of 
self-presentation, (2) is attentive to social-comparison 
information as cues to situation-appropriate, expressive 
self-presentation, (3) has the ability to control and modify 
self-presentation, (4) can use this ability in particular 
situations, and (5) shows cross-situational variability in 
behavior. 
The popularity of the self-monitoring scale is evident 
in the volumes of research that have employed its use. In 
the area of nonverbal expressiveness, several studies have 
investigated its relationship to encoding and decoding. 
Snyder (1974) reported that high self-monitors were more 
accurate senders of posed facial expressions and vocal cues 
than were low self-monitors. Krauss, Geller, and Olson 
(1976) reported that high self-monitors were more able to 
fake expressions of honesty while delivering a deceptive 
message. While Geizer, Rarick, and Soldow (1977) found that 
high self-monitors were more accurate in judging or decoding 
deception than low self-monitors, several other studies have 
found little relationship between self-monitoring and 
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nonverbal decoding skills (Zuckerman, Hall, Defrank, & 
Rosenthal, 1976; Cunningham, 1977). Rosenthal, Hall, 
DiMatteo, Rogers, and Archer (1979) found only very low 
correlations between self-monitoring and decoding in six 
studies and the median correlation was negative ( ~ = -.08). 
In a recent study by Danheiser and Granziano (1982), 
self-monitoring was studied in relation to cooperation. 
Using a decomposed PDG, they predicted and found that the 
prospects of future interaction with the other player (con-
federate) increased cooperation of the high self-monitors, 
but not the low self-monitors. No relationship was found 
between self-monitoring and cooperation. In the present 
study, self-monitoring will again be used as a dependent 
measure to investigate its relationship to cooperation and 
competition and also with the Affective Communication Test. 
Machiavellianism Scale 
Machiavellianism is a personality disposition towards 
interpersonal control and manipulation for self gain. 
Christie and Geis (1970a) have attempted to describe and 
measure this orientation with the use of two Mach scales. A 
twenty item Likert-type Mach IV Scale has been the 
predominately used measure of this orientation reported in 
the literature. The Mach IV scale has been a very popular 
tool in several areas of social psychology including several 
studies that have examined the relationship between 
Machiavellianism and bargaining behavior. 
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In an experiment by Geis (1965), high, middle, and low 
scorers on the Mach scale bargained over the division of a 
number of points with each other in a three-person coalition 
game. Information as to the relative power status of the 
players was also varied. The results showed that the high 
Machs consistently outbargained the low and middle Machs, 
and this effect was more pronounced when information on the 
power status was ambiguous. Christie and Geis (1970b), in a 
replication of this experiment, found the same effect using 
greater stakes, the division of $10 instead of points. 
Christie, Gergen, and Marlowe (1970) investigated the 
effect of Machiavellianism using a variant of the PDG in 
which the players played against a preprogramed experimental 
strategy. After playing the first ten trials for points, 
they played for either a penny or a dollar a point. High 
and low Machs did not differ in cooperativeness when playing 
for points, but high Machs were more cooperative than low 
Machs when the stakes were changed from points to pennies, 
and even more cooperatively inclined when playing for 
dollars. High Machs seem to play cooperatively when it is 
to their advantage. 
Machiavellianism has also been shown to be related to 
success at lying (DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; Exline, 
Thibaut, Hickey, & Gumpert, 1970). Edelstein (1966), in an 
unpublished study cited in Christie and Geis (1970a), found 
that High Machiavellians bluffed more frequently and took 
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greater risks than Low Machiavellians in a two-person game. 
Exline et al. (1970) found High Machiavellians to be better 
at "keeping their cool" when accused of cheating. DePaulo 
and Rosenthal (1979) found that high Machiavellians were 
fairly successful at lying but not particularly skilled at 
detecting lies. In an unpublished study by Nickell (1980) 
in which the detection of lying was investigated, it was 
found that High Machiavellians perceived fewer lies than Low 
Machiavellians. Thus, while Machiavellians may tell more 
lies, and be more successful at lying, they may not expect 
the same strategy from others. 
The Affective Communication Test 
The Affective Communication Test (ACT) is a 13 item 
self-report scale, developed by Friedman, Prince, Riggio, 
and DiMatteo (1980) which measures individual differences in 
nonverbal expressiveness or what is know as "charisma." 
Based on a nine point scale, the maximum score is 117 with a 
minimum of 13. The article by Friedman et al. (1980) 
contains four main areas of research on the ACT. First, 
pilot studies and reliablity studies were conducted. 
Second, the relationship between nonverbal expressiveness 
and aspects of interpersonal relations were investigated. 
Third, the ties between nonverbal expressiveness and other 
personality approaches were examined. Finally, the links 
between nonverbal expressiveness and nonverbal communication 
skills were studied. 
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Reliability estimates based on two test-retest samples 
were found to be relatively high ( ~ = .90 and~= .91), as 
well as internally consistent ( ~ = .77). Friedman et al. 
(1980) found there to be a significant relationship between 
the ACT scores and the ratings by friends, ~ = .39, E < .05, 
indicating some validity. Friedman et al. (1980) also 
expected that salespersons would tend to be nonverbally 
expressive, especially those in face-to-face persuasion. A 
case study in which the number one Toyota salesman in the 
United States scored 99 on the ACT suggests that expressive-
ness is indeed characteristic of salemanship. Friedman et 
al. (1980) also believed that expressive people tend to 
interact with lots of people or have lots of followers. 
Using family physicians as an example, the ACT was found 
significantly related to the popularity (patients' visits) 
of the physicians,~= .52, E < .01, (Friedman et al., 
1980). In a study of nonverbal greetings, Riggio, Friedman, 
and DiMatteo (1981) found the ACT to be significantly 
related to an overall index of intimacy, ~ = .40, E < .01. 
The relationship between the ACT and several personal-
ity variables was studied by Friedman et al. (1980). The 
ACT was found to be positively related to extraversion and 
slightly negatively related to neuroticism using the Eysenck 
Personality Inventory, suggesting that expressiveness is not 
due to emotional responsivity. The correlation between the 
ACT and social desirability, which is the tendency to 
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describe oneself in favorable ways (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964), 
showed a low correlation, ~ = .22, E < .06, suggesting that 
the ACT does contain a small element of social desirability. 
Machiavellianism, or the tendency to manipulate or "con" 
others for selfish reasons, was unrelated to the ACT. The 
ACT was found related to the internal-external locus of con-
trol, ~ = -.28, E < .05. Friedman et al. (1980) posit that· 
some people may feel that they want and can control those 
around them. They also found self-esteem, an individual's 
judgment of self worth, to be positively related to the ACT, 
r = .27, E < .05. 
In order to distingish nonverbal expressiveness from 
self-monitoring, Friedman et al. (1980) gave the ACT and the 
self-monitoring scale (Snyder, 1974) to two samples of 
subjects. The ACT was found only slightly related to 
self-monitoring in both Samples, ~ = .14 and r = .21. This 
is not unexpected because expressiveness refers mainly to 
communication rather than to monitoring. Because it is 
uncertain exactly how expressiveness and self-monitoring are 
related or affect cooperation and competitiveness, both 
measures will be used in this study. 
The relationship between the ACT and nonverbal 
communication skills is important if the ACT is to be used 
as a substitute measure of nonverbal ability. The 
relationship of nonverbal expressiveness and acting ability 
(posed sending) would be one indication of this question. 
Recent research has shown moderate to large correlations 
between posed sending and spontaneous sending (Cunningham, 
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1977; Zuckerman et al., 1976). In a study that investigated 
the relationship between the ACT and posed emotional sending 
(Friedman et al., 1980), expressiveness as measured by the 
ACT was demonstrated to be positively related to acting 
ability, but the effects were small. A large sex difference 
was also found. For females, a strong correlation emerged 
between the ACT and acting ability. For males, however, the 
relationship was zero or even slightly negative. In 
general, the ACT seems related to but by no means identical 
with nonverbal sending ability. 
In conclusion, nonverbal expressiveness as measured by 
the ACT is expected to effect the level of cooperation in a 
conflict game. Subjects who are expressive may be able to 
use this ability to deceive their opponent in progressive 
stages of the PDG. This effect is expected only for those 
players who can see each other during the game. Expressive 
players are also expected to lie more in the messages they 
send before making their decision, but again only when the 
other player is visible. It is possible, however, that 
expressive persons may use this ability to facilitate 
cooperation· and trust during the game. 
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Sex Differences 
Competition and Cooperation 
A large number of studies of competitive game situ-
ations have included considerations of sex differences. 
Rubin and Brown (1975) report that their search of the lit-
erature uncovered over 100 studies which dealt with sex dif-
ferences, although usually as a secondary consideration. 
They reason that the relative "economy" of the sex variable 
(e.g., easily varied, college populations tend to be co-ed 
in composition) can account for the number of studies. 
A review of the studies on sex differences yields a 
series of confusing, often contradictory, findings. A num-
ber of studies have found no systematic relationship between 
gender and the relative frequency with which players behave 
cooperatively in a two-person game (e.g., Tedeschi, Gahagan, 
Aranoff, & Steele, 1968; Voissem, & Sistrunk, 1971). A num-
ber of other studies report that males bargain more coopera-
tively than females (e.g., Rapoport & Chammah, 1965; Oskamp, 
& Pelman, 1965). In direct opposition are an even greater 
number of studies reporting that females bargain more coop-
eratively (e.g., Aranoff, & Tedeschi, 1968; Bond, & Vinacke, 
1961) . 
Based on a number of studies, females appear to be more 
sensitive than males to a number of interpersonal cues in a 
conflict situation (Rubin & Brown, 1975). Grant and Sermat 
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(1969) found that females are more influenced than males by 
the sex of the other player in a PDG. They found that 
females were more competitive when playing males and more 
cooperative when they played a female player. Kahn, Hottes, 
and Davis (1971) found females to be influenced by the 
attractiveness of the other player, cooperating more often 
in the presence of an attractive other player. Horai, 
Lindskold, Gahagan, and Tedeschi (1969) found that when no 
communication was allowed, men were more cooperative than 
women, and the reverse was true when players received commu-
nication promises from the other player. Wiley (1973) found 
that with verbal communication allowed, there were no sex 
differences with same sex players, but when verbal communi-
cation was allowed, and the players were of the opposite 
sex, a high level of cooperativeness was evident. In con-
clusion, Rubin and Brown (1975) argue that males and females 
do not differ in their inherent nature to cooperate, but 
that they are sensitive to different cues. This sensitivity 
may have a possible effect in this study. 
Nonverbal Skills 
It appears from the evidence that women have a slight 
edge over men in several areas of nonverbal communication. 
Hall (1978) summarized the results of 75 studies that report 
accuracy for males and females at decoding nonverbal commu-
nication. The results showed that more studies show a 
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female advantage than would be expected by chance. The 
average effect was of moderate magnitude and was signifi-
cantly larger than zero. Hall (1979) reviewed previous non-
verbal expressive studies and concluded that adult females 
are also slightly more expressive (in the sense of being 
communicators of posed emotions) than males. 
Hall (1979) reviewed several possible explanations for 
why females are superior to males in decoding and encoding 
nonverbal expressions. Females seem to have an advantage in 
affective responsiveness or empathy (Hoffman, 1977). The 
empathy hypothesis would mean that women's greater advantage 
to decode and encode nonverbal cues is due to their greater 
empathy or emotional responsiveness. Another explanation 
for gender difference might be gender-role sterotypes, and 
the nature of masculinity-femininity (Buck, 1977). For 
example, boys may learn to mask their emotions through the 
socialization process. English (1972) and others have 
hypothesized that the superiority of women may be due to an 
adaptation to an asymmetrical degree of social power and 
that when they are denied such controls, they become espe-
cially alert to the behaviors and moods of others and 
develop subtle ways of evoking social influence. Rosenthal 
and DePaulo (1979) have also proposed that women are social-
ized to be more accommodating toward others. This leads to 
greater encoding and decoding abilities on the part of the 
accommodator who wants his or her message to be easy to 
read. 
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Research with the ACT is consistent with the research 
and interpretation cited above; women were found slightly 
more expressive than males (Friedman et al., 1980). Evi-
dence of sex difference have also been found showing women 
to be better self-monitors, which is analogous to self-de-
coding (Snyder, 1974). 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis ]:: It is expected that a Nonverbal Expres-
siveness by Machiavellianism by Visual Communication inter-
action will occur for cooperativeness. No main effect for 
Nonverbal Expressiveness is expected. However, subjects who 
are High Nonverbally Expressive, Low Machiavellian, and are 
able to see the other player are expected to be the most 
cooperative. Highly Expressive, High Machiavellian subjects 
when they are able to see the other player are expected to 
be least cooperative. 
Hypothesis ~: High Machiavellians are expected to be 
more competitive than Low Machiavellians. While there is 
some evidence that Machiavellians will cooperate when it is 
to their advantage (Christie, Gergen, and Marlowe, 1970), a 
number of studies have found that High Machiavellians tend 
to be more competitive than Low Machiavellians (e.g., Geis, 
1965). 
Hypothesis 3: It is expected that subjects will be 
more cooperative when they can see the other player than 
when their vision is blocked. Research by Wichman (1970) 
indicates that the richer mediums, such as face-to-face, 
increase the level of cooperation in the PDG. 
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Hypothesis 1: High Machiavellians are expected to win 
more money (points) than Low Machiavellians. Several stud-
ies, (e.g., Christie & Geis, 1970b; Christie, Gergen, and 
Marlowe, 1970), have found that High Machiavellians consis-
tently outbargain Low and Middle Machiavellians in bargain-
ing games. In fact, High Machiavellians have been found to 
even cooperate if it is to their advantage in making more 
money (Christie, Gergen, & Marlowe, 1970). 
Hypothesis ~: It expected that Low Machiavellians will 
perceive more trust between themselves and the other player. 
This prediction is consistent with several studies including 
(Christie, Gergen, & Marlowe, 1970) who found that High 
Machiavellians rated the other player as significantly less 
trustworthy than did Low Machiavellians. 
Hypothesis ~: High Nonverbally Expressive subjects are 
expected to score higher on the Self-Monitoring scale than 
Low Nonverbal Expressive subjects. While nonverbal expres-
siveness and self-monitoring are not equivalent constructs, 
both are related nonverbal skills. While Friedman et al. 
(1980) found relatively low correlations between these two 
measures, their sample size was fairly small and this may 
have accounted for the lack of a significant relationship in 
their study. 
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Hypothesis J_: similar to Hypothesis 1, a Nonverbal 
Expressiveness by Machiavellianism by Visual Communication 
interaction is expected for lying. Highly expressive, High 
Machiavellians, when they can see the other player are pre-
dicted to lie the most. Low Expressive, Low Machiavellians 
will lie least when they are able to see the other player. 
Hypothesis ~: High Machiavellians are expected to lie 
more than Low machiavellians. A number of studies have 
shown that Machiavellians lie more often and are also more 
successful at deception. This effect should be even more 
pronounce when Visual Communication is available, thus a 
Machiavellianism by Visual Communication interaction is also 
expected. Exline et al. (1970) found High Machiavellians to 
be better at "keeping their cool" when accused of cheating 
and confronted with the task of lying in a face-to-face 
situation. 
Hypothesis 9: A Nonverbal Expressiveness by Visual 
Communication interaction is predicted for deception. High 
Nonverbally Expressive players are expected to lie more when 
the other player is visible. Expressive ability should have 
no effect on the frequency of deception when the other 
player is not visible.· 
CHAPTER III 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Eighty female subjects participated in this study, with 
40 serving as Player-confederates. All subjects were 
recruited from introductory psychology classes, and received 
extra credit toward their grades. Subjects were also payed 
a small amount of money dependent on their play in the 
experimental game. 
Design 
The experimental design was a 2 X 2 X 2 three factor 
mixed design with repeated measures on the last factor. The 
classification variables were nonverbal expressiveness of 
the player and Machiavellianism of the player. A third 
variable, visual communication, was manipulated as a within-
subject factor. These variables will be described in detail 
below. Nonverbal expressiveness of the player was opera-
tionally defined as their score on the ACT. The two levels 
of expressiveness were determined by a 3-way split of the 
potential subjects pool. The middle third of potential sub-
ject on the ACT served as Player-Confederates. Machiavelli-
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anism was operationally definded as a subject's score on the 
MACH IV scale. The two levels of Machiavellianism were also 
determined by a 3-way split with the upper third of the dis-
tribution designated as High Machiavellians and the lower 
third of the distribution as Low Machiavellians. Visual 
communication was defined by whether visual communication 
was available or not. The players played two games, one in 
which they were able to see each other and one in which a 
curtain barrier blocked their view. This repeated measure 
variable was counterbalanced during the study. 
Apparatus 
The games utilized three prisoner's dilemma game 
machines: a control unit which was operated by the experi-
menter in order to relay game play, and two player units. 
The player units consist of a number of labeled buttons 
which allow for the sending of standard messages, and two 
labeled push-buttons which designate possible game choices. 
The player units also contained a matrix that would light up 
to signify the outcome of the previous round. When both 
players made a cooperative choice (choice 1) on a trial, 
each received four points. When both players made a compet-
itive choice (choice 2), each lost four points. When one 
player made a cooperative choice (choice 1) and the other 
player made a competitive choice (choice 2), the cooperative 
player lost five points and the competitive player gained 
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five points. The two player units were located in the same 
room and faced each other. The control unit was in a sepa-
rate room that overlooked the players' room through one-way 
mirrors. 
Procedures 
Before the actual game phase began, several hundred 
potential subjects were given the ACT (see Appendix B) and 
the MACH IV scale (see Appendix C) during their introductory 
psychology class for extra credit. They were asked if they 
would like to be in the second part of the study for more 
extra credit, and if so to indicate "yes" on their cover 
sheet (see Appendix D) and to indicate a phone number where 
they could be reached. Subjects who indicated "no" on the 
cover sheet, failed to include a phone number, or had any 
missing data on the two scales were discarded from the sub-
ject pool. Three-hundred and fifty-seven subjects, 164 
males and 193 females, completed both scales and agreed to 
be in the rest of the study. Separate 3-way splits for 
males and females were conducted for both the ACT and the 
MACH IV scale. Males and females were separately categor-
ized into 9 cells (3 levels of expressiveness by 3 levels of 
Machiavellianism). Based on this categorization, it was 
decided to use females in the second part of the study, as 
only 12 males were found to be High ACT and High MACH, with 
10 of these 12 needed in the actual study. At least 18 
females were found in each category, therefore providing a 
better potential subject pool. Confederate-players were 
sampled out of the middle third of the ACT distribution to 
control for the expressiveness of the other player. The 
subjects were later called to set up appointments for par-
ticipation in the actual game. 
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As soon as either the player or player-confederate 
showed up, she was moved to a separate room to ensure that 
the players would not see each other before the actual game. 
Both the player and player-confederate were taken to the 
game room and given the general instructions at the same 
time (see Appendix E). To motivate both the confederate 
player and the player, a monetary incentive was provided. 
Both players started with $1.00 and every point gained added 
one cent. Thus according to the way the game was explained, 
the players believed that they could win a possible $2.00 or 
end up even. Because the experimenter controlled the other 
players' choices, the players could actually only win $1.10 
or end up with $.90 for each game. Both the player-confed-
erate and the player were given a game quiz (Appendix F) 
which ensured a working knowledge of the game. The player-
confederate and the player kept track of the score with sep-
arate game sheets (see Appendix G). To control for con-
founding based on the player-confederate play, both players 
played against a randomly determined play selection in which 
there were 50% cooperative choices and 50% competitive 
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choices. This preprogramed play circumvented controlling 
for the player-confederate's level of Machiavellianism. At 
the completion of the first twenty-trial game, the player-
confederate was led to a separate room and asked to complete 
a game rating (see Appendix H). The player also completed 
the game rating. While both subjects complete the game rat-
ing for the first game, the curtain was either opened or 
closed in order to manipulate the visual communication vari-
able. The player-confederate was led back to the game room, 
and both players played another 20 trial game. At the com-
pletion of this twenty trial game, the player and player-
confederate were asked to complete a second game rating (see 
Appendix H) and the Self-Monitoring Scale (See Appendix I). 
Both the player-confederate and the player were payed their 
appropriate sums and given a debriefing (see Appendix J). 
After being debriefed, they were asked to read and sign a 
confidentiality agreement (see Appendix K). Any further 
questions were answered, and the subjects were thanked for 
participating, and then released. 
Dependent Variables 
The primary dependent variable was the frequency of 
cooperative responses by the player. This was operationally 
defined as the number of Choice l's made during the game. 
The score of the game, which relates to the choices made, 
was also measured. The messages sent by the player before 
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each decision were also scored. The possible messages were: 
"I will make Choice 1", "I will make Choice 2", or "I won't 
say." Also, based on the message sent and the decision 
made, the number of lies were tabulated. A lie was any mes-
sage, except for "I won't say", that was followed by a dif-
ferent choice decision, e.g., a message "I will make Choice 
1" followed by a Choice 2 decision. 
The game rating measure (Appendix H) contains several 
game perception ratings that concern the players' percep-
tions of: meeting the game objectives, effectiveness in the 
game, cooperativeness in the game, affective feelings about 
the results, and feelings of trust during the game. The 
final dependent variable was the subjects' scores on the 
self-monitoring scale (Appendix I). 
CHA.PTER IV 
RESULTS 
Subject Pool Data 
Except for the original publication by Friedman et al. 
(1980), no normative data is available on the Affective 
Communication Test (ACT}. Therefore, it seems apppropriate 
to first report the results for the large subject pool that 
was used for the actual experiment. Overall, 358 subjects, 
164 males and 194 females, completed both the ACT and the 
Machiavellianism Scale, and agreed to take part in the rest 
of the study. The norms for the ACT in the present subject 
pool and for two separate samples by Friedman et al. (1980) 
are presented in Table I. The overall mean ACT score in the 
present study was 72.85 compared to 71.2 and 71.3 found in 
the two samples by Friedman et al. (1980). These means and 
other descriptive statistics show very close agreement. 
The mean Machiavellianism score for the subject pool 
was 88.82. This is ~elatively low, but with college 
populations it is not considered unusual. The relationship 
between the ACT and Machiavellianism is important in 
delineating whether expressiveness, as measured by the ACT, 
and Machiavellianism, as measured by the MACH IV Scale, 
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represent two separate dimensions of interpersonal 
orientation. The correlation between the ACT and the MACH 
IV was .08 in both the present study and in the study by 
Friedman et al. (1980). This indicates that expressiveness 
and Machiavellianism are orthogonal dimensions. 
Sex Differences in the Subject Pool 
As found by Friedman et al. (1980), there were 
significant sex differences in expressiveness as measured by 
the ACT. In this sample of 164 males and 194 females, the 
mean scores were 69.9 and 75.3 respectively, ! (356) = 3.47, 
E < .001. Thus, these results are consistent with the 
findings of Friedman et al. (1980) that report women to be 
slightly more nonverbally expressive than men. Consistent 
with the literature, men scored higher on the Machiavellian 
scale than women. For the 164 males and 194 females, the 
means were 91.5 and 86.6 respectively, ! (356) = 3.85, E < 
.001. 
Experimental Results 
All hypotheses, except for expected interactions, were 
tested by ~ Eriori test (one-tailed) at the .05 significance 
level. In order to provide the most complete description of 
the results, effects that are significant at the .10 level 
or better will be cautiously reported. Because of the 
numerous dependent measures, all summary ANOVA's are found 
in Appendix L. The analysis of the results were computed 
using the SAS computer program package (Helwig & Council, 
1979). 
Pre-choice Messages 
36 
Before each trial, subjects were asked to send a 
message concerning what they would do on the next trial. 
Overall, for each twenty trial game, subjects sent 40.1% 
cooperative messages, 36.4% competitive messages, and 23.2% 
''I won't say" messages. For the experimental variables, very 
little effect was found for any of the messages except for a 
possible Expressiveness by Machiavellianism by Visual 
Communication interaction for cooperative messages, f (1,36) 
= 3.60, E < .07. As shown in Table II, this trend effect 
indicates that the High Expressive, and High Machiavellian 
subjects sent the most cooperative messages when they could 
not see the confederate player. 
Player Choices 
Overall, subjects made 46.3% cooperative choices and 
53.7% competitive choices. It was expected that a Nonverbal 
Expressiveness X Machiavellianism X Visual Communication 
interaction would occur for cooperativeness (Hypothesis l); 
however this effect was not found. It was also expected 
that High Machiavellians would make more competitive choices 
than Low Machiavellians (Hypothesis 2). However, Low 
Machiavellians made slightly more competitive choices 
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( ~ = 10.90 than high Machs ( ~ = 10.60). It was also 
hypothesized that when subjects could see the other player, 
they would make more cooperative responses (Hypothesis 3). 
While subjects were more cooperative when they could see the 
other player ( ~ = 9.60) than when the other player was 
blocked ( ~ = 8.93), this effect was not significant, 
f (1,36) = 1.51, (ns). 
Total Money Won by Subject 
Overall, subjects averaged $1.01 for each game played 
or a total of $2.02 for the two games played. The maximum 
won by any one player was $1.10 and the minimum won was 
$.90. It was expected that High Machiavellians would win 
more money (Hypothesis 4). The results showed that Low 
Machiavellians actually made slightly more money in the 
game. An interesting trend between Machiavellianism and 
Visual communication, f (1,36) = 3.08, E < .09, shown in 
Table III, indicates that low Machiavellians made more money 
(scored more points) when they could see the other person, 
while the High Machiavellians made more money when their 
vision of the other player was blocked. This effect is just 
the opposite of what the literature predicts (e.g., 
Christie, Gergen, & Marlowe, 1970). 
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TABLE I 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE ACT 
Statistics Present Friedman et al. (1980) 
Study Sample 1 Sample 2 
N 358 289 311 
Mean 72.8 71.2 71. 3 
Median 73.0 71.1 71. 3 
Mode 73.0 69.0 68.0 
Minimum 30.0 28.0 25.0 
Maximum 115.0 114.0 116.0 
SD 15.0 16.4 15.2 
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TABLE II 
MEANS FOR COOPERATIVE PRE-CHOICE MESSAGES 
Variable Low Machiavellian High Machiavellian 
Low ACT High ACT Low ACT High ACT 
See Other 
Player 7.60 7.90 8.80 8.40 
Cannot See 
Other 7.60 7.10 7.80 9.50 
TABLE III 
MEAN MONEY MADE FOR THE GAME 
Variable 
See Other 
Player 
Other Player 
Blocked 
Machiavellianism 
LOW HIGH 
$1. 014 $1.000 
$1.004 $1. 014 
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~layer Game Perceptions 
Following each game, players were asked to rate their 
perceptions of the game (see Appendix H). On their 
perception of meeting the game objectives (to win as many 
points as possible), an Expressiveness by Machiavellianism 
interaction was found, I (1,36) = 4.27, E < .05. As shown 
in Table IV, Low Expressive, Low Machiavellians and High 
Expressive, High Machiavellians felt more strongly that they 
had met the game objectives. 
Although subjects did not play more cooperatively when 
they could see the other player than when the other player 
was not visible, players did perceive the game as being 
played more cooperatively when they could see the other 
player M = 3.55) than when they could not see the other 
player M 3.28), t (39) = 1.84, 2 < .05. 
As expected in Hypothesis 5, Low Machiavellians 
perceived more player trust in the game ( ~ = 2.98) than 
High Machiavellians ( ~ = 2.45), ! (38) = 1.81, E < .05. A 
possible interaction between Expressiveness and Visual 
Communication for perceived trust was also indicated, 
F (1,36) = 3.08, E < .09. As shown in Table V, High 
Expressive players tended to perceive more trust when they 
could see the other player while Low Expressive players 
tended to perceive more trust when they did not see the 
other player during the game. 
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TABLE IV 
MEANS FOR MEETING GAME OBJECTIVES 
Variable Machiavellianism 
Low High 
Low Expressive 4.00 3.55 
High Expressive 3.40 3.80 
TABLE V 
MEANS FOR PLAYER PERCEPTION OF TRUST 
Variable Expressiveness 
Low High 
See Other 
Player 
Other Player 
Blocked 
2.65 
2.90 
2.80 
2.50 
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No significant effects were found for players' 
perceptions of their effect on what happened during the 
game, nor their feeling good about what happened during the 
game. A fairly strong correlation was found between making 
competitive choices during the game and players' perceptions 
of their effect on what happened during the game, £ = .47, 
E < .001. A subject's feeling of trust was positively 
related to the perception of the game being played 
cooperatively, £ = .47, E < .001. The relationship between 
perceived cooperativeness and perceived satisfaction about 
the game was also found significant, £ = .26, E < .02. 
Self-Monitoring Scale 
It was expected that High expressive players would 
score higher on the self-monitoring scale (Hypothesis 6). 
High expressive players did score higher on the 
self-monitoring scale than Low expressive players; the means 
were 13.45 and 11.45 respectively, ! (38) = 1.88, E < .05. 
The relationship between subjects ACT and self-monitoring 
scores was significant, £ = .23, E < .04. Also not totally 
unexpected, High Machiavellians scored higher on the 
Self-Monitoring scale ( ~ = 13.55) than Low Machiavellians 
( ~ = 11.35), ! (38) = 2.07, E < .05. The relationship 
between subject Self-monitoring and MACH IV Scores was 
significant, £ = .25, E < .02. Self-monitoring was not 
found to be significantly related to cooperativeness, 
r = . 12 , ( ns) . 
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Lying Behavior 
The PDG methodology used in this study provided a very 
convenient way of studying lying or bluffing. While players 
were told it was not necessary to make the same game choice 
they indicated in their message statement (e.g., "I'll make 
Choice l", followed by a Choice 1 response), such behavior 
did constitute deception on the part of the player. This is 
reflected in the study where subjects stated more 
cooperative intentions and yet made more actual competitive 
responses. It should also be noted that subjects could 
choose the "I won't say" message, in which case no lying (or 
truthfulness) would occur. Overall, subjects averaged 4.50 
lies for the twenty-round game with a minimum of zero lies 
and a maximum of 13 lies by one player. 
It was expected that a Nonverbal Expressiveness by 
Machiavellianism by Visual communication interaction would 
occur for lying (Hypothesis 7), but the predicted effect was 
not found. It was also expected that High Machiavellians 
would send more deceptive messages than Low Machiavellians, 
especially when visual communication was available between 
the players (Hypothesis 8). High Machiavellians did send 
more deceptive message ( ~ = 5.33) compared to Low 
Machiavellians ( ~ = 3.60), ! (38) = 2.08, E < .03. A 
possible Machiavellianism by Visual Communication trend was 
indicated, f (1,36) = 3.67, E < .07, but the expected 
relationship was not evident. As shown in Table VI, High 
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Machiavellians told more lies when visual communication was 
blocked between the players, while Low Machiavellians told 
more lies when they could see the other player. It should 
be noted in Table VI, that High Machiavellians in a 
face-to-face interaction did send more deceptive messages 
than for either conditions for the Low Machiavellians. The 
expected interaction between nonverbal expressiveness and 
visual communication for sending deceptive messages was also 
found (Hypothesis 9), f (1,36) = 5.23, E < .03. As shown in 
Table VII, no difference in lies was found between 
expressiveness when the players could see one another, 
however while Low Expressive players told more lies than the 
High Expressive players when visual communication was 
blocked, a simple effects test revealed that this difference 
was not significant, ! (38) = 1.62, (ns). Lying or bluffing 
evidently is a good strategy for winning, shown by the 
significant correlation between lying and the total number 
of points (money) that the player scored, r = .22, E < .04. 
However, lying was also negatively related to the perception 
of player trust, ~ = - .22, E < .05. 
TABLE VI 
MEAN LIES FOR MACHIAVELLIANISM BY VISIBILITY 
Variable Machiavellianism 
Low High 
See Other 
Player 
Other Player 
Blocked 
3.80 
3.35 
4.80 
5.85 
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TABLE VII 
MEAN LIES FOR EXPRESSIVENESS BY VISIBILITY 
Variable Expressivenesss 
See Other 
Player 
Other Player 
Blocked 
Low High 
4.25 4.40 
5.45 3.75 
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CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Normative data on the Affective Communication Test 
(ACT) from the present study is very consistent with the 
findings by Friedman, Prince, Riggio, & DiMatteo (1980). 
While not providing any additional validity data, the 
results from this subject pool support the idea that studies 
using the ACT may be compared across certain geographical 
areas. Sex differences using the ACT were also consistent 
with Friedman et al. (1980), showing that females report 
being more nonverbally expressive than males. If in fact 
the ACT does measure nonverbal expressiveness, the results 
support the notion that females are more nonverbally 
expressive. Several studies support this idea that women 
appear to hold a slight advantage over men in several areas 
of nonverbal communication (Hall, 1979; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 
1979). The present results and the findings of Friedman et 
al. (1980) imply that not only are women better at certain 
nonverbal behaviors, they also believe and/or are aware that 
they are more nonverbally expressive. 
Indications of sex differences in nonverbal communica-
tion skills raise important questions concerning the origin 
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and nature of these differences. It is possible that much 
of these differences are based on sex role socialization. 
Buck, Miller, and Caul (1974) found females tended to be 
"externalizers" while males tended to be "internalizers". 
Lanzetta and Kleck (1970) suggest that internalizers are 
persons who have been dissuaded from displaying emotional 
responses overtly. Thus, it may be that our culture tends 
to socialize boys to inhibit and mask many kinds of emotions 
to a greater extent than girls, possibly leading to the ten-
dency of adult males to be internalizers of emotions. Other 
possible explanations include the hypothesis that, from an 
evolutionary point of view, women may be endowed with a 
greater innate capacity for learning to communicate nonver-
bally (Hall, 1981). There is also the possibility that 
these sex differences are tied to cognitive determinants. 
Using a facial judgment task, Allport (1924) found women 
were not more accurate than men, but they did make these 
decisions quicker. He speculated that women may be more 
intuitive than men who are more analytic. He assumed that 
the intuitive mode was faster in processing the information. 
More recently, Safer (1978) speculates that women's advan-
tage in recognizing emotions may be tied to gender differ-
ences in hemispheric lateralization. 
A great deal more work is needed to determine the 
nature of these sex differences and their origins. If 
socialization is the key determinant, specialized training 
in the school system etc., may be useful in helping boys 
learn to express emotional affect. 
A Two Dimensional Study of Conflict 
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The great majority of studies on conflict have treated 
conflict as a unidimensional variable. The overwhelming 
preponderance have investigated only the cooperativeness-
competi tiveness dimension in the study of conflict behavior. 
Several lines of research propose that the cooperative-com-
peti tive dimension is insufficient in reflecting the sub-
ject's perception of conflict behavior (Ruble & Thomas, 
1976). The major purpose of this study was to test a two-
dimensional schema for conflict behavior. Nonverbal expres-
siveness, as measured by the ACT, was used to represent an 
aspect of of one dimension called interpersonal orientation 
(IO) by Rubin and Brown (1976). The cooperative-competitive 
dimension was represented by the Machiavellianism continuum, 
measured by the Mach IV scale. 
The results showed little support for the nonverbal 
expressiveness-Machiavellianism dimensions as descriptors of 
conflict behavior. Hypothesis 1 predicted that highly non-
verbal expressive, Low Machiavellian persons would be most 
cooperative when they could see the other player. This 
effect was not found, and in fact none of the variables or 
interactions effected cooperativeness. 
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There are several possible explanations for why nonver-
bal expressiveness failed to mediate any effects. One, the 
PDG as a representation or model of conflict is too artifi-
cal for subjects to get highly involved in the interaction. 
The PDG apparatus used in this study requires that the sub-
ject watch buttons light up, push buttons, and finally 
record the results. Random observation by the experimenters 
saw little indication that the players were watching each 
other. Perhaps the trials were too fast for face-to-face 
interactions or nonverbal expressiveness to have any effect. 
Pilisuk, Skolnick, Thomas, & Chapman (1967) found an 
increase in cooperativeness by increasing the number of min-
utes between trials. They interpreted the change in terms 
of "cognitive reappraisal". Secondly, the monetary incen-
tives used in the study may not have been enough incentive 
to get the players actively involved in the game. Thirdly, 
the type of PDG played can have an effect. Players in this 
study played against a preprogramed opponent. This prepro-
gramed play was neither predominantly cooperative (50%) nor 
competitive (50%). If the highly nonverbally expressive 
female subjects were also good decoders of nonverbal cues, 
perhaps they were confused by any inconsistencies in the 
confederate player's behavior and the actual trial outcome. 
Finally, perhaps nonverbal expressiveness is not a salient 
aspect of a person's interpersonal orientation to conflict 
in some situations. A recent study by Danheiser and Granzi-
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ano (1982) investigated the relationship between self-moni-
toring and cooperation. They found that self-monitoring by 
itself did not affect the level of cooperation but the 
inclusion of a situational variable, the prospects of future 
interacts with the other player, produced an interaction 
effect. The prospects of possible future interaction with 
the other player increased cooperation for high self-moni-
tors but not for low self-monitors. Thus, the nonverbal 
aspects of the interaction may have become more salient in 
that situation. 
The other dimension, cooperative-competitive, repre-
sented by Machiavellianism, also failed to effect coopera-
tiveness (Hypothesis 2). This contradicts several studies 
that have shown High Machiavellians to be more competitive 
using the PDG paradigm (e.g., Christie, Gergen, & Marlowe, 
1970). The incentive system used may have influenced this 
finding. Christie, Gergen, and Marlowe (1970) found that 
competitveness decreased as the incentive values changed 
from points to pennies to dollars. 
It was expected that not only would Machiavellians be 
more competitive, they were also expected to make more money 
(Hypothesis 4). Studies have shown that High Machiavellians 
even seem willing to cooperate if it is to their advantage 
in making more money (Christie, Gergen, & Marlowe, 1970). 
This study found no significant difference although the 
trend was opposite of the prediction, that is, Low Machiav-
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ellians made slightly more money than High Machiavellians. 
Similarly, in an experiment by Lake (1967), Low Machiavelli-
ans also made more money than High Machiavellians but again 
the effect was nonsignificant. An interesting interaction 
between Machiavellianism and visual communication showed 
that Low Machiavellians made more money when they could see 
the other person while the High Machiavellians made more 
money when their vision was blocked. Although this effect 
showed only a trend towards significance ( E < .09), the 
results are opposite of what the research would predict 
unless you consider the situation. Machiavellians generally 
do better on a variety of tasks when in in a face-to-face 
situation and the face-to-face variable is salient to the 
situation. When High Machiavellians won more money in the 
face-to-face bargaining in the ten dollar game (Christie & 
Geis, 1970b) but did not win more in the study by Christie, 
Gergen, and Marlowe (1970) which employed a PDG in which 
subjects were not playing a live opponent, the face-to-face 
variable was not salient (Geis & Christie, 1970). Geis and 
Christie (1970) suggest that the lack of an opportunity to 
improvise could account for this difference. This could 
also explain the results of the present study where subjects 
did not have any chance to improvise. 
As expected, High Machiavellians perceived less player 
trust than Low Machiavellians (Hypothesis 5). This is con-
sistent with several studies including (Christie, Gergen, & 
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Marlowe, 1970) which found that High Machiavellians rated 
the other player as significantly less trustworthy than did 
Low Machiavellians. 
Although the present study failed to find evidence of a 
two-dimensional model for conflict behavior, several lines 
of research have found support for it (Thomas, 1976; Hall, 
1969). Stemming from the work of Blake and Mouton (1964), 
Thomas and his colleagues proposed that two separate dimen-
sions are important to conflict behavior (Thomas, 1976; 
Thomas & Kilmann, 1974; Ruble & Thomas, 1976). One dimen-
sion, "assertiveness", concerns the degree to which a party 
would like to satisfy his/her own concerns. The second 
dimension, "cooperativeness'', is based on the degree to 
which he/she would like to satisfy the concerns of others. 
Based on these two dimensions, five possible conflict orien-
tations are possible: competitive, collaborative, avoidant, 
accommodative, and compromising. Based on this theoretical 
model of conflict behavior, the Thomas-Kilmann Conflict MODE 
(Managment Of Difference Excercise) instrument was designed 
(Thomas & Kilmann, 1974). This forced-choice instrument was 
designed to reduce social desirability responses that affect 
some of the other measures of conflict managment strategies 
(Kilmann & Thomas, 1977; Thomas & Kilmann, 1978). There 
have been some external validity studies conducted on the 
MODE (e.g., Jamieson & Thomas, 1974; Ruble & Thomas, 1976) 
but few studies have been reported that have not been done 
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by Thomas and his associates. For example, introverted per-
sons tend to score higher on avoidance while individuals who 
emphasize expressing feelings rather than thinking, score 
higher on accommodation (Kilmann & Thomas, 1975). The major 
use of the MODE and other such measurement devices, e.g., 
the Managment of Conflict Survey (Hall, 1969), seems to be 
in conflict managment workshops. Based on a recent trend 
all across the country to set up informal mediation pro-
grams, Weider-Hatfield (1981) believes that the use of meas-
urement devices such as the MODE will increase as many medi-
ator training classes include analysis of the participants 
own conflict managment system. 
The crux of this discussion on the two dimensional 
model of conflict behavior concerns the lack of evidence for 
a nonverbal expressiveness and Machiavellianism model. 
Based on the two dimensional model proposed by Thomas 
(1976), further research on the effects of nonverbal expres-
siveness could be tested within the assertiveness and coop-
erativeness framework. 
Visual Communication 
It was expected that players would be more cooperative 
when they were able to see the other player (Hypothesis 8). 
While this effect was in the right direction, the trend was 
not significant. While several studies have suggested that 
this effect should occur (e.g., Wichman, 1970; LaPlante, 
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1971), others have found equivocal results (e.g., Vitz & 
Kite, 1970). Williams (1977) suggests that the communica-
tion mediums that are richer in nonverbal cues lead to more 
favorable impressions, but this effect does not appear to be 
strong. An indication that this may be true was found in 
this study. Although players were not significantly more 
cooperative when they could see the other player, they did 
perceive the game as being played more cooperatively when 
they could see one another. 
Self-Monitoring 
As expected, high nonverbally expressive subjects 
scored higher on the self-monitoring scale than low nonver-
bally expressive subjects. This is somewhat discrepant from 
the findings reported by Friedman et al. (1980). They 
found nonverbal expressiveness and self-monitoring to be 
only slightly related. This relationship was slightly 
stronger for females in their study and gender differences 
may account for the effect in the present study. At least 
with females, evidently nonverbal expressiveness does have 
something to do with the ability to control one's communica-
tion so that their expressions seem appropriate to the situ-
ation. 
Although not hypothesized, High Machiavellians also 
scored significantly higher on the self-monitoring scale 
than Low Machiavellians. Snyder (1979) reported that self-
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monitoring and Machiavellianism were unrelated. In addition 
to this F-test, the correlation between Machiavellian scores 
and self-monitoring scores were positive and significant. 
Caution should be noted however as only High and Low 
Machiavellian scores were computed into this correlation. 
Based on the multitude of research on Machiavellianism, 
being aware of one's behavior would seem to indicative of a 
High Machiavellian. Further research is needed before any 
strong conclusions can be made concerning the exact nature 
of this relationship. 
As in a recent study (Danheiser & Granziano, 1982), 
self-monitoring was not related to cooperativeness. In 
their study, a situational variable, the prospect of future 
interaction, did produce an interaction between self-moni-
toring and cooperativeness. 
Lying Behavior 
A secondary purpose of this study was to investigate 
bluffing or lying on the part of participates in a conflict 
situation. In most PDG studies, pre-choice messages are not 
a part of the methodology. However, this study demonstrates 
that this kind of PDG may be a very convenient method for 
studying deception. Many methods for the study of deception 
suffer from demand characteristics. The fact that the game 
(PDG) does concern conflict could easily be used to disguise 
the real purpose of studying deception. 
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In the present study, several interesting results con-
cerning deception were found using this method. A predicted 
three-way interaction was not found (Hypothesis 7). This 
same predicted interaction was also not found for coopera-
tiveness. However, the expected interaction betweert nonver-
bal expressiveness and visual communication was found 
(Hypothesis 9), although the exact nature of this interac-
tion was surprising. It was expected that the high nonver-
bally expressive subjects would lie more than the low non-
verbally expressive subjects when in a face-to-face 
interaction. However, no difference was found for nonverbal 
expressiveness when in a face-to-face confrontation, but low 
nonverbally expressive subjects did lie more when visual 
communication was blocked. Possibly, subjects low on non-
verbal expressiveness felt more comfortable lying in a non 
face-to-face interaction, whereas for the highly expressive 
subjects, visibility made no difference. 
As predicted, Machiavellianism also had an effect on 
the deceptiveness of subjects. It was expected that High 
Machiavellians would lie more than Low Machiavellians, and 
that this effect would be especially true in face-to-face 
interactions (Hypothesis 8). Previous research indicates 
that Machiavellians are especially good liars in face-to-
face situation such as being accused of cheating (Exline, et 
al., 1970). While High Machiavellians did send more decep-
tive messages than Low Machiavellians, the expected interac-
tion was opposite in nature. That is, High Machiavellians 
sent more deceptive messages when visual communication was 
blocked, while Low Machiavellians sent more deceptive mes-
sages in face-to-face interactions. Evidently, while 
Machiavellians use more deception in an attempt to manipu-
late others, situational variables are also important. 
Further Research and Conclusions 
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In their review of twenty years of experimental gaming, 
Pruitt and Kimmel (1977) suggest the need to develop methods 
for studying and understanding how people gather information 
about one another's willingness to cooperate. One viable 
way in which people can gain this information is through 
nonverbal channels. Although this study found little evi-
dence for the importance of nonverbal behaviors (e.g., non-
verbal expressiveness and visual communication) in a con-
flict situation, a recent study by Danheiser and Granziano 
(1982) hints to possible reasons. For nonverbal behaviors 
to become salient enough to affect the conflict process, 
certain situational features need to be present. In this 
study, the trials were probably too brief to allow any 
improvising and attempts to influence the other interactant 
with nonverbal behaviors. Further evidence is indicated by 
the lack of replication of previous results for Machiavelli-
anism and visual communication in the conflict process. 
This suggests that future research using the PDG as the 
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principle method should include fewer and much longer trials 
in order to make nonverbal behaviors more salient. Inc re as-
ing the monetary value of each trial might also help 
increase the motivation of subjects to look for and seek 
information relevant to the conflict process. Other situ-
ational variables, such as the prospects of future interac-
tion with the other player, used in the Danheiser and Gran-
ziano (1982) study, could also produce interaction effects. 
The PDG method itself may not be most appropriate in 
studying nonverbal behaviors and conflict. Other conflict 
methods such as the "Crisis Game" (Vitz & Kite, 1970), a 
negotiation procedure outlined by Johnson, McCarty and Allen 
(1976), or the modification of the "Minimum Necessary Share 
Game" (Foddy, 1978) may be more effective in facilitating 
the salience of nonverbal behaviors in the conflict process. 
Finally, although the PDG may not be the most appropri-
ate method for studying nonverbal effects, the PDG is still 
quite useful and relevant in several different research 
domains. This study indicates the possibility of using the 
PDG in the study of deception. A recent review by Sommer 
(1982) also suggests that the PDG is very relevant to the 
criminal justice system. In particular, Sommer (1982) sug-
gests the focus of PDG research should be shifted back to 
the original description of the dilemma, that is, the plea 
bargaining process between two suspects and the District 
Attorney. He describes a recent case in which the PDG was 
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extremely analogous to the real world of plea bargaining. 
Som.mer suggests that the PDG could be a valuable training 
tool in law schools and to assist inmates to make informed 
choices if they should ever become involved in plea bargain-
ing in the future. 
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PDG SCORING SYSTEM 
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CHOICES POINTS 
I PLAYER 1 I PLAYER 2 PLAYER 1 PLAYER 2 I 
l ____ I ____________ I 
I I I I I 
I 1 1 __ 1 I +4 I +4 I 
,- I ,--,--, 
I __ 2 I 2 I -4 I -4 I I ,- ,--,--1 
! __ 1 ! __ 2 I -5 I +5 I I I ,--,--1 
1 __ 2 1 __ 1 1 __ +5 __ 1 __ -5 __ 1 
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AFFECTIVE COMMUNICATION TEST 
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Self-descriptive Questionnaire 
SEX: Male Female Code# 
Please Read These Instructions Carefully. Below you will 
find a series of statements indicating an attitude or 
behavior that might be true as it applies to you or might 
not be true of you. Your task is to read carefully each 
statement and circle the number between minus four (-4) and 
plus (4) that best indicates your answer. The more negative 
your answer, the more you believe the statement is false as 
it applies to you. The more positive your answer, the more 
you believe the statement is true of you. 
EXAMPLE: 
I feel very happy when I see pretty flowers. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
Circling 2 would indicate that you feel somewhat happy when 
you see flowers but not as much as if you had circled number 
4. If you had circled -4, this would mean that the opposite 
is true--that you feel very unhappy when you see flowers. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Please circle only 
one number on each scale. Read each statement carefully and 
indicate an answer for every one. 
1. When I hear good dance music, I can hardly keep still. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
2. My laugh is soft and subdued. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
3. I can easily express emotion over the telephone. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
4. I often touch friends during conversations. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
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5. I dislike being watched by a large group of people. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
6. I usually have a neutral facial expression. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
7. People tell me that I would make a good actor or 
actress. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
8. I like to remain unnoticed in a crowd. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
9. I am shy among strangers. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
10. I am able to give a seductive glance if I want to. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
11. I am terrible at pantomime as in games like charades. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
12. At small parties I am the center of attention. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
13. I show that I like someone by hugging or touching that 
person. 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 
Not at all true of me Very true of me 
APPENDIX C 
MACHIAVELLIAN SCALE 
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Listed below are a number of statetments. Each 
represents a commonly held opinion and there are no right or 
wrong answers. You will probably disagree with some items 
and agree with others. We are interested in the extent to 
which you agree or disagree with such matters of opinion. 
Read each statement carefully. Then indicate the extent 
to which you agree or disagree based on the scale below. 
Give your opinion on every statement. If you find that the 
numbers to be used in answering do not adequately indicate 
your opinion, use the one which is closest to the way you 
feel. 
1 
Disagree 
Strongly 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
Agree 
Strongly 
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something 
unless it is useful to do so. 
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what 
they want to hear. 
3. One should take action only when it is morally right. 
4. Most people are basically good and kind. 
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious 
streak and it will come out when they are given a 
chance. 
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases. 
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else. 
8. Generally speaking, men won't work hard unless 
they're forced to do so. 
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than 
to be important and dishonest. 
10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is 
best to give the real reason for wanting it rather 
than giving reasons which carry more weight. 
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, 
moral lives. 
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking 
for trouble. 
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13. The biggest difference between most criminals and 
other people is that the criminals are stupid enough 
to get caught. 
14. Most men are brave. 
15. It is wise to flatter important people. 
16. It is possible to be good in all respects. 
17. Barnum was wrong when he said that there's a sucker 
born every minute. 
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here 
and there. 
19. People suffering from incurrable diseases should have 
the choice of being put painlessly to death. 
20. Most men forget more easily the death of their father 
than the loss of their property. 
APPENDIX D 
COVER SHEET 
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Personal Values Study 
INSTRUCTIONS: The following psychological scales concern 
personal values and opinions about yourself and others. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Please carefully read 
the directions for each scale before beginning that scale. 
The results of this study will be used in connection with 
another study that will be conducted later in the semester. 
If you would like to participate in the future study for 
more extra credit, answer "yes" to the question below and. 
indicate your phone number. If you do not want to 
participate in the future study, indicate only your name and 
class instructor. Regardless of whether your say yes or no, 
you will receive extra credit for this study. All results 
from this study will be kept in strict confidence and all 
names and phone numbers will be destroyed upon completion of 
the the study. Thank you for your participation and help. 
Your Instructor: 
~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
Would you like to participate in the future study? YES 
NO 
If you answered yes, 
what is a phone # that you can be reached 
at? 
~~~~~~~~~~ 
APPENDIX E 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS TO PLAYERS 
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Your task today will involve communicating with another 
person. But rather than just talking to each other, all of 
the verbal communication will be accomplished with the use 
of the machines in front of you. 
In order to familiarize you with the procedures involved, 
we will practice the communication process using these 
machines. In addition to the machines in front of you, 
there is a central unit which will be operated by the 
experimenter, and is located in a separate adjacent room. 
Players will simply send and receive messages concerning 
some decisions they will be making. 
The overall objective for players is to accumulate as 
many points as possible. Notice that the players' panels 
each have a matrix of four squares containing various 
numbers with plus and minus signs. The numbers in the upper 
triangles {POINT OUT) of the squares correspond to the 
number of points you would receive in a particular round. 
The other player would receive the number of points 
designated in the lower triangle (POINT OUT) of the square. 
The points you receive in a round depend partly on a choice 
you make, and partly upon the choice the other player makes. 
Notice that if you both make CHOICE 1, you both gain points 
(DEMONSTRATE). If you both make CHOICE 2, you both lose 
points (DEMONSTRATE). If you make CHOICE 1 and the other 
player makes CHOICE 2, then the outcome is that you lose 
points while the other player gains points (DEMONSTRATE). 
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Likewise, if you make CHOICE 2 and the other player makes 
CHOICE 1, the outcome is that you gain points and the other 
player loses points (DEMONSTRATE). So you see, you gain or 
lose points depending on the choices you and the other 
player make on any given round. Remember, the objective of 
the game is to gain as many points as possible and avoid 
losing points. 
Prior to making your choice, you will be asked to send 
one of three messages to the other player concerning the 
choice you are about to make on a particular round. The 
other player will do the same. The messages you may send 
before you make your choice are located under the "MESSAGE 
TO" sign in the upper right corner of your panel. The 
messages you will receiving from the other player are 
located under the "MESSAGE FROM" sign in the upper left 
corner of the machine. If you say that you will make a 
particular choice, it is totally up to you as to whether you 
make the choice you said you would. Keep in mind that you 
are free to use the message, "I won't tell my choice." 
In order to help motivate you in your decision making, 
you will start out with $1.00 and for every point gained you 
will add 1 cent. Thus for the twenty round game, you can 
possibly make $2.00 or end up even. In order to keep track 
of the score of the game, you will fill out a scoring sheet 
as the game goes along. 
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In summary, each round of the game requires three actions 
of each player: 
(1) Send a message to the other player pertaining to the 
choice you will make. 
(2) Make either CHOICE 1 or CHOICE 2. 
(3) Mark the choices and points scored on the scoring sheet. 
Are there any questions about what has been said up to 
this point? (DEAL ONLY WITH QUESTIONS PERTAINING TO WHAT's 
BEEN SAID). 
APPENDIX F 
KNOWLEDGE OF GAME QUIZ 
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1. When the red CHOOSE light comes on, you should: 
a. choose a message to send. 
b. make "Choice 1 11 or "Choice 2". 
c. pick the other players' message choice. 
2. The MESSAGE TO light indicates that you: 
a. should push a button and send a message to the 
other player. 
b. should wait for a message from the other player. 
c. should make "Choice 1 11 or "Choice 2". 
3. When the light beside MESSAGE FROM is on, this tells 
you: 
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a. the other player is about to send a message to you. 
b. to send a message from yourself to the other 
player. 
c. the experimenter is sending a message to you. 
4. The light beside the statement begins a new 
round. 
a. MESSAGE TO 
b. MESSAGE FROM 
c. CHOOSE 
5. Each point you win is equal to 
a. $.01 
b. $.05 
c. Nothing 
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TRIAL MY CHOICE! OTHER's POINTSITOTAL 
___ I I 
_# __ 1_1_2_1_1 __ 2_ 1_100 
I I I 
_1 ___ l __ I__ __ I __ 
I I I 
_2 ___ l __ I _______ _ 
I I 
_3 ___ l __ I _______ ---
1 I 
_4 ___ l __ I _______ _ 
I I 
_5 ___ l_._I _______ _ 
I 
_6 ___ I __ -- -- --- --
1_7_ -- -- -- -- --- ---
8 
- - -- -- -- -- --- ---
9 
- - -- -- -- -- --- ---
10 
- --------------
_11_ -- -- -- -- --- --
12 
- --------------
13 
- --------------
14 
- --------------
_15_ -- -- -- -- --- --
16 
- --------------
17 
- --------------I 
_18_1 __ -- -- -- --- ---
1 
_19_1 __ -- -- -- --- ---
1 
_20_1 __ -- -- -- --- ---
87 
APPENDIX H 
GAME RATING 
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Circle the number which indicates your feeling on the 
following items. 
1. My performance met the objectives given for my role. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 
Don't 
Know 
3 4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
2. I had a greater effect than the other player on what 
happened in this game. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 
Don't 
Know 
3 4 
3. This game was player cooperatively. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 
Don't 
Know 
3 4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
4. I feel good about what happened in this game. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 
Don't 
Know 
3 4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
5. The players showed that they trust each other. 
Strongly 
Disagree 
1 2 
Don't 
Know 
3 4 
Strongly 
Agree 
5 
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Personal Reaction Inventory 
Instructions: The statements that follow concern your 
personal reactions to a number of different situations. No 
two statements are exactly alike, so consider each statement 
carefully before answering. If a statement is TRUE or 
MOSTLY TRUE as applied to you, blacken the "a" response on 
the computer answer sheet. If a statement is FALSE or NOT 
USUALLY TRUE as applied to you, blacken the "b" response on 
the computer answer sheet. Do not answer on the test 
booklet. It is important that you answer as frankly and as 
honestly as you can. Your answers will be kept in the 
strictest confidence. 
1. I find it hard to imitate the behavior of other people. 
2. My behavior is usually an expression of my true inner 
feelings, attitudes, and beliefs. 
3. At parties and social gatherings, I do not attempt to 
do or say things other will like. 
4. I can only argue for ideas which I already believe. 
5. I can make impromptu speeches even on topics about 
which I have almost no information. 
6. I guess I put on a show to impress or entertain people. 
7. When I am uncertain how to act in a social situation, I 
look to the behaviors of others for cues. 
8. I would probably make a good actor/actress. 
9. I rarely need the advice of my friends to choose 
movies, books, or music. 
10. I sometimes appear to others to be experiencing deeper 
emotions than I actually am. 
11. I laugh more when I watch a comedy with others than 
when alone. 
12. In a group of people I am rarely the center of 
attention. 
13. In different situations and with different people, I 
often act like very different persons. 
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14. I am not particularly good at making other people like 
me. 
15. Even if I am not enjoying myself, I often pretend to be 
having a good time. 
16. I'm not always the person I appear to be. 
17. I would not change my opinion (or the way I do things) 
in order to please someone else or win their favor. 
18. I have considered being an entertainer. 
19. In order to get along and be liked, I tend to be what 
people expect me to be rather than anything else. 
20. I have never been good at games like charades or 
improvisational acting. 
21. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different 
people and different situations. 
22. At a party I let others keep the jokes and stories 
going. 
23. I feel a bit awkward in company and do not show up 
quite so well as I should. 
24. I can look anyone in the eye and tell a lie with a 
straight face (if for the right end). 
25. I may deceive people by being friendly when I really 
dislike them. 
APPENDIX J 
DEBRIEFING STATEMENT 
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This completes your participation in the study. There 
really was no right or wrong way to respond. Your natural 
responses will greatly help us understand how people in 
general react in this type of situation. As you might have 
guessed, this is a study about conflict between people. Our 
basic purpose is to see how people deal with conflict and 
how nonverbal expressions influence cooperation and 
competition. The last scale you rated is a Self-Monitoring 
Scale that measures how well you monitor your nonverbal 
behaviors. Earlier in your class, you took another scale 
that measured nonverbal expressiveness. The study also 
concerns the effect of seeing one another during the game. 
APPENDIX K 
CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT 
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I hearby agree to keep any information concerning this 
experiment in strictest confidence until the experiment is 
completed and at which time the full nature and results of 
this experiment are made available to all who participated 
and would like any information. 
Signed=~~~~-
Thank you for participating and for you confidential-
ity. If you have any problems or questions concerning this 
experiment, feel free to contact me. 
Gary Nickell (X6024) 
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TABLE VIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR COOPERATIVE MESSAGES 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 l. 51 0.07 .79 
MACH group (B) 1 23.11 1.11 . 30 
A * B 1 2.81 0.14 .72 
SUB(A * B) 36 749.45 
Within 
Visual ( c) 1 0.61 0.21 .65 
A * c 1 2.11 0.72 .40 
B * c 1 l. 01 0.35 .56 
A * B * c 1 10.51 3.60 .07 
c * Sub(A * B) 36 105.25 
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TABLE IX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR COMPETITIVE MESSAGES 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 2.45 0.12 .73 
MACHgroup (B) 1 8.45 0.41 .53 
A * B 1 4.05 0.19 .66 
SUB(A * B) 36 748.00 
Within 
Visual ( c) 1 1.80 0.62 .44 
A * c 1 3.20 1.10 .30 
B * c 1 1. 80 0.62 .44 
A * B * c 1 1. 80 0.62 .44 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 104.40 
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TABLE X 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR NO MESSAGE 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 0.11 0.01 .93 
MACHgroup (B) 1 3.61 0.29 .59 
A * B 1 0.11 0.01 .93 
SUB(A * B) 36 450.15 
Within 
Visual (C) 1 0.31 0.17 .68 
A * c 1 0.11 0.06 .80 
B * c 1 0.11 0.06 .80 
A * B * c 1 3.61 2.02 .16 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 64.35 
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TABLE XI 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR COOPERATIVE CHOICES 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 0.11 0.01 .94 
MACH group ( B) 1 1.51 0.09 .77 
A * B 1 9.11 0.53 .47 
SUB(A * B) 36 622.25 
Within 
VISUAL (C) 1 9.11 1.51 .22 
A * c 1 0.61 0.10 .75 
B * c 1 13.61 2.25 .14 
A * B * c 1 5.51 0.91 . 34 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 217.65 
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TABLE XI I 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR COMPETITIVE CHOICES 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACTgroup (A} 1 0.20 0.01 .92 
MACHgroup ( B) 1 1. 80 0.10 .75 
A * B 1 9.80 0.57 .46 
SUB(A * B} 36 624.20 
Within 
Visual ( c} 1 8.45 1. 39 .24 
A * c 1 0.45 0.07 .79 
B * c 1 14.45 2.37 .13 
A * B * c 1 6.05 0.99 .32 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 219.60 
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TABLE XIII 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR POINTS SCORED 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 0.11 0.01 .94 
MACH group (B) 1 1. 01 0.06 .81 
A * B 1 12.01 0.66 . 42 
SUB(A * B) 36 651. 85 
Within 
VISUAL ( c) 1 1. 01 0.11 .74 
A * c 1 12.01 1.34 .25 
B * c 1 27.61 3.08 .08 
A * B * c 1 0.01 0.01 .97 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 322.85 
104 
TABLE XIV 
ANOVA FOR PERCEIVED MEETING OF OBJECTIVES 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 0.61 0.72 .40 
MACHgroup ( B) 1 0.01 0.01 .90 
A * B 1 3.61 4.27 .05 * 
SUB(A * B) 36 30.45 
Within 
VISUAL ( c) 1 0.11 0.45 .51 
A * c 1 0.61 2.44 .13 
B * c 1 0.11 0.45 .51 
A * B * c 1 0.61 2.44 .13 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 9.05 
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TABLE XV 
ANOVA FOR PERCEIVED EFFECTIVENESS IN GAME 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACTgroup (A) 1 2.11 2.10 .16 
MACHgroup ( B) 1 1. 51 1. 51 .23 
A * B 1 0.61 0.61 .43 
SUB(A * B) 36 36.15 
Within 
VISUAL ( c) 1 1. 01 1. 88 .18 
A * c 1 0.11 0.21 .65 
B * c 1 0.01 0.02 .88 
A * B * c 1 0.01 0.02 .88 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 19.35 
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TABLE XVI 
ANOVA FOR PERCEIVED COOPERATIVENESS 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 0.11 0.05 .82 
MACHgroup ( B) 1 2.11 0.97 .33 
A * B 1 0.02 0.01 .94 
SUB(A * B) 36 78.65 
Within 
VISUAL ( c) 1 1. 51 3.39 .07 
A * c 1 0.31 0.70 .41 
B * c 1 0.61 1. 37 .25 
A * B * c 1 0.01 0.03 .87 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 16.05 
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TABLE XVII 
ANOVA FOR PERCEIVED FEELING ABOUT THE GAME 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACTgroup (A) 1 0.01 0.01 .92 
MACHgroup ( B) 1 0.01 0.01 .92 
A * B 1 0.31 0.23 .63 
SUB(A * B) 36 48.65 
Within 
VISUAL ( c) 1 0.01 0.02 .88 
A * c 1 0.11 0.20 .66 
B * c 1 0.31 0.56 .46 
A * B * c 1 0.01 0.02 .88 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 20.05 
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TABLE XVI II 
ANOVA FOR PERCEIVED PLAYER TRUST 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 0.31 0.19 .67 
MACHgroup (B) 1 5.51 3.29 .08 
A * B 1 2.81 1. 68 .20 
SUB(A * B) 36 60.25 
Within 
VISUAL (C) 1 0.01 0.03 .87 
A * c 1 1. 51 3.08 .09 
B * c 1 0.01 0.03 .87 
A * B * c 1 0.31 0.64 .43 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 17.65 
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TABLE XIX 
ANOVA FOR SELF-MONITORING SCALE 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 80.00 3.55 .07 
MACHgroup (B) 1 96.80 4.30 .OS * 
A * B 1 24.20 1. 07 .31 
SUB(A * B) 36 810.80 
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TABLE XX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE FOR LYING 
SOURCE DF SS F p 
Between 
ACT group (A) 1 12.01 0.87 .36 
MACH group (B) 1 59.51 4.33 .04 * 
A * B 1 1. 01 0.07 .79 
SUB(A * B) 36 495.15 
Within 
VISUAL (C) 1 1. 51 0.46 .50 
A * c 1 17.11 5.23 .03 * 
B * c 1 12.01 3.67 .07 
A * B * c 1 0.01 0.03 .95 
c * SUB(A * B) 36 117.85 
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